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Abstract
This paper explores information flow control in systems in which the security classes of data can vary
dynamically. Information flow policies provide the means to express strong security requirements for
data confidentiality and integrity. Recent work on security-typed programming languages has shown that
information flow can be analyzed statically, ensuring that programs will respect the restrictions placed
on data. However, real computing systems have security policies that vary dynamically and that cannot
be determined at the time of program analysis. For example, a file has associated access permissions
that cannot be known with certainty until it is opened. Although one security-typed programming lan-
guage has included support for dynamic security labels, there has been no examination of whether such
a mechanism can securely control information flow. In this paper, we present an expressive language-
based mechanism for securely manipulating dynamic security labels. The mechanism is presented both
in the context of a Java-like programming language and, more formally, in a core language based on
the typed lambda calculus. This core language is expressive enough to encode previous dynamic label
mechanisms; as importantly, any well-typed program is provably secure because it satisfies noninterfer-
ence.
1 Introduction
Information flow control protects information security by constraining how information is transmitted among
objects and users of various security classes. These security classes are expressed as labels associated with
the information or its containers. Dynamic labels, labels that can be manipulated and checked at run time,
are vital for modeling real systems in which security policies may be changed dynamically. For example, it
is important to be able to change security settings on files and database records, and these changes should
affect how the information from these sources can be used.
However, manipulating labels dynamically makes it difficult to enforce a strong notion of information
security such as noninterference [8] for several reasons. First, downgrading the label of an object may
convert sensitive data to public data, directly violating noninterference. Second, label changes can be used
to convey information covertly; some restriction has to be imposed to prevent such covert channels [28, 21].
Third, the usual way to control information flow in the presence of dynamic labels is mandatory access
control (MAC), which generally cannot prevent implicit flows arising from the control flow paths not taken
at run time [4, 12].
Static information flow control techniques, such as those developed by Denning and Denning [5], are
able to analyze all control flow paths and prevent illegal implicit flows. Moreover, static information flow
analysis incurs little run-time overhead. Recently, static information flow analyses have been formalized in
security type systems (e.g., [26, 10, 32, 18, 3, 20]) that can provably enforce noninterference. Nevertheless,
in most security-typed languages, security labels are purely static type-level information that cannot be
accessed or tested at run time.
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JFlow [14] and its successor, Jif [16] are the only security-typed languages supporting dynamic labels.
However, although the Jif type system is designed to control the new information channels that dynamic la-
bels create, it has not been proved to enforce secure information flow. Further, the dynamic label mechanism
in Jif has limitations that impair expressiveness and efficiency.
In this paper, we propose a new, expressive language-based mechanism for securely manipulating dy-
namic security labels. We show that the mechanism is useful in practice by incorporating it into Jif and
demonstrating that the resulting language, Jif-DX, is more expressive than Jif. Further, we study the sound-
ness of this mechanism by formalizing it in a core language based on the typed lambda calculus and proving
that any well-typed program of the core language is secure because it satisfies noninterference. This is the
first noninterference proof for a security-typed language in which general security labels can be manipulated
and tested dynamically.
While downgrading security classes [24, 15] is an important capability, it is useful to treat it as a separate
mechanism so that labels can be manipulated dynamically while preserving noninterference. However, the
Jif language does support a downgrading mechanism without resorting to dynamic labels.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some background on lattice
label models and dynamic labeling. Section 3 introduces the static analysis framework for dynamic labels
and the Jif-DX language. Section 4 formalizes the static analysis of dynamic labels as the type system of
a core language λDSec and proves the noninterference result. Section 5 covers related work, and Section 6
concludes.
2 Background
2.1 Security classes
We assume that security requirements for confidentiality or integrity are defined by associating security
classes with users and with the resources that programs access. These security classes form a lattice L. We
write k v k′ to indicate that security class k′ is at least as restrictive as another security class k. In this
case it is safe to move information from security class k to k′, because restrictions on the use of the data are
preserved. To control data derived from sources with classes k and k′, the least restrictive security class that
is at least as restrictive as both k and k′ is assigned. This is the least upper bound, or join, written k unionsq k′.
2.2 Labels
Type systems for confidentiality or integrity are concerned with tracking information flows in programs.
Types are extended with security labels that denote security classes. A label ` appearing in a program may
be simply a constant security class k, or a more complex expression that denotes a security class. The
notation `1 v `2 means that `2 denotes a security class that is at least as restrictive as that denoted by `1.
Because a given security class may be denoted by different labels, the relation v generates a lattice
of equivalence classes of labels with unionsq as the join (least upper bound) operator. Two labels `1 and `2 are
equivalent, written `1 ≈ `2, if `1 v `2 and `2 v `1. The join of two labels, `1unionsq `2, denotes the security class
that is the join of the security classes that `1 and `2 denote. For example, if x has label `x and y has label `y,
then the sum x+y is given the label `x unionsq `y.
2.3 Security type systems for information flow
Security type systems can be used to enforce security information flows statically. Information flows in
programs may be explicit flows such as assignments, or implicit flows [5] arising from the control flow of
the program. Consider an assignment statement x=y, which contains an information flow from y to x. Then
the typing rule for the assignment statement requires that `y v `x, which means the security level of y is
lower than the security level of x, guaranteeing the information flow from y to x is secure.
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One advantage of static analysis is more precise control of implicit flows. Consider a simple conditional:
if b then x = true else x = false
After running this expression, the value of x is equal to b, although there is no direct assignment from b to
x. A standard technique to prevent illegal implicit flows is to introduce a program-counter label [4], written
pc, which indicates the security level of the information that can be learned by knowing the control flow
path taken thus far. The type system ensures that any effect of expression e has a label at least as restrictive
as its pc. In other words, expression e cannot generate any effects observable to users who should not know
the current program counter.
2.4 Dynamic labels in Jif
Jif [16] (previously known as JFlow [14]) is the only existing security-typed language that supports dy-
namic labels. Jif extends the Java language [9] with security labels that are based on the decentralized label
model [15]. These labels may explicitly mention principals. For example, a value with type int{Alice:Bob}
is an integer owned by principal Alice and readable by Alice and Bob. Jif aims to provide a usable pro-
gramming model, in which the dynamic label mechanism plays an important role.
In Jif, security labels can be used as first-class values, so labels are not purely static type annotations. In
addition, variables of type label (label variables) may be used as a label for other values. Label variables
provide a straightforward way to represent dynamic labels. For example, suppose x is a label variable.
Then *x refers to the label contained in x, and {*x} is a legitimate label in Jif if x is declared final so
that it cannot be assigned after initialization, and the meanings of labels do not change as variables are
assigned. Dynamic labels are treated as unknown but fixed labels by the compiler, so they can be propagated
in static checking. For example, given any two labels `1 and `2 such that `1 v `2, it is the case that
`1 unionsq {*x} v `2 unionsq {*x}.
Since dynamic labels are generally unknown at compile time, it may be impossible to decide statically
whether `1 v `2 holds. In this case, the condition `1 v `2 can only be enforced by examining labels at run
time. For example, suppose a program tries to send an integer through a network channel that is created at
run time and has a dynamic label. The operation is safe only if the label of the channel is at least as high as
the label of the integer; this condition can only be tested at run time.
Jif provides the switch label statement for run-time label tests. The following code shows how to
implement the above example using the switch label statement:
(A) final label{} x;
Channel{*x} c;
int{Alice:} y;
switch label(y) {
case (int{*x} z) c.send(z);
else throw new UnsafeTransfer();
}
The label of channel c is a dynamic label {*x}. The label of x is the bottom label {}, which means the
information about x is public. The switch label statement executes the first of the cases whose associated
label is at least as restrictive as that of y. The value of y is assigned to the corresponding variable (for
example, z). Thus the send operation will be executed only if {Alice:} v {*x}, guaranteeing that c is a
secure channel for sending y.
Like labels, principals may also be used as first-class values at run time. The statement actsFor(p1,
p2)S executes the statement S if the principal p1 can act for the principal p2. This acts-for relationship
between p1 and p2 is equivalent to {p2:} v {p1:}. Thus the actsFor statement essentially implements a
run-time label examination.
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3 Static analysis of dynamic labels
This section presents a general framework for static checking of dynamic labels. We propose the language
Jif-DX, which extends Jif with a more expressive dynamic label mechanism based on this framework.
3.1 Static checking framework for dynamic labels
Static checking of dynamic labels must rely on the information about dynamic labels available at com-
pile time. The insight behind the new static checking framework is to represent this information as label
constraints of the form `1 v `2. For example, the constraint {Alice:} v {*x} indicates that the label
contained in x is at least as restrictive as {Alice:}. Then it is safe to assign a value of label {Alice:} to a
variable of label {*x}, even though the exact value of x is unknown.
For a security-typed language, static information flow checking is an aspect of type checking, which
ensures that a well-typed expression does not generate illegal information flows. In general, if type-checking
an expression e involves dynamic labels, the compiler can reason more accurately about information flow by
exploiting the set of label constraints known to be satisfied when e is executed. Thus, tracking and using the
label constraints of each expression is the key to improving static checking of dynamic labels. Essentially,
a label constraint is a kind of type constraint, which has been used in bounded polymorphic types, type
inference and dependent type systems [23, 30].
We can classify label constraints into three categories: dynamic constraints, static constraints and im-
plicit constraints. This classification helps identifying various label constraints systematically and provides
hints for new dynamic label constructs.
• Dynamic label constraints
Dynamic label constraints are constraints enforced by testing labels at run time. For example, consider
the switch label statement: switch label(e) {. . .case (T{`} y): S . . .}. If S is executed,
then `e v ` (`e represents the label of e) must be satisfied, and thus, the constraint could be used in
type-checking S. However, Jif does not make use of this constraint when statically checking S.
• Static label constraints
Static label constraints are constraints enforced statically by the compiler. For example, in Jif, an
actsFor constraint “p1 actsFor p2” may be specified in a method signature to prevent the method
from being called unless the compiler can determine that principal p1 acts for p2 at the call site [14].
This actsFor constraint is similar to a static label constraint {p2:} v {p1:}, though it has some
separate utility in Jif.
One advantage of static constraints is that no run-time cost is incurred because they are enforced
statically. Furthermore, not all the static constraints can be enforced dynamically because some labels
such as class label parameters [14] have no run-time representations.
• Implicit label constraints
Implicit label constraints are not explicitly specified in programs, but can be inferred from programs.
For example, consider the statement “final label lb = `”. It is clear that the constraint {*lb} ≈
` holds after the statement is executed. Implicit label constraints can be used to type-check call
expressions. In the following code, the type of expression o.m({Alice:},10) is int{Alice:}
because of an implicit constraint {*lb} ≈ {Alice:} that arises from argument passing.
(B) interface I { int{*lb} m(label{} lb, int{*lb} x); }
I{} o; ...
int{Alice:} y = o.m({Alice:}, 10);
To enable the compiler to generate an implicit label constraint for every actual label argument, Jif
imposes a syntactic restriction on the method argument of type label: the actual label argument in
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a call expression must be an expression that can be converted to a label without evaluation. This
restriction does not substantively affect expressiveness. For example, given an arbitrary expression e
of type label, the expression o.m(e,10) can be rewritten as “final label t = e; o.m(t,10)”,
where t can be converted to the label {*t}.
3.2 The Jif-DX language
The original Jif dynamic label mechanism appears to be sound but has several limitations. First, label
checking of the clauses of a switch label statement does not fully exploit the label constraint enforced by
the run-time check. Second, Jif supports only one kind of static label constraint: actsFor constraints, which
give information about principals but are not as powerful as general label constraints. Third, in Jif only label
variables can be used as dynamic labels, but in practice other expressions may be useful in dynamic labels.
These limitations of Jif make it difficult or awkward to write some applications that need to manipulate
dynamic labels. Therefore, we propose the Jif-DX language, which extends Jif with a better dynamic label
mechanism, including the label-test statement, method and field label constraints, and more general label
expressions.
3.2.1 The label-test statement
Jif-DX provides the label-test statement, which is a more flexible way to implement run-time label checks
than the switch label statement. The syntax of the label-test statement resembles a normal if statement,
except that the conditional expression must be a label constraint syntactically: “if (`1<=`2) S1 else
S2”. Intuitively, S1 is executed if `1 v `2 is true at run time; otherwise, S2 is executed. Because `1 v `2
must hold if S1 is executed, this constraint can be assumed to hold when checking S1 statically.
Both the switch label statement and the actsFor statement in Jif can be encoded with the label-test
statement. For example, the statement “actsFor(p1, p2) S” is equivalent to “if ({p2:} <= {p1:}) S”.
3.2.2 Method label constraints
Jif-DX allows general label constraints to be specified in method signatures, whereas Jif only provides
actsFor constraints. The following example shows a use of a label constraint on a method:
(C) class Key[principal p] {
int{} encrypt(label{} lb, int{*lb} x) where {*lb} <= {p:} { ... }
}
The class Key[principal p] represents a key belonging to principal p. The encrypt method takes in
a label lb and an integer x labeled with {*lb}, and attempts to encrypt x with the key of principal p and
return the encrypted result as a public integer. This method should only encrypt the data owned by principal
p, because the result can be decrypted by p. This requirement is captured by the method label constraint
{*lb} v {p:}. The compiler ensures that the constraint is satisfied wherever this method is called.
Another way to write this code would be to insert a run-time check in the method body and make the
method throw an exception if {*lb} v {p:} is not satisfied at run time. This code would incur some
unnecessary run-time label checks, and the caller would have to handle the exception somehow. Indeed,
one advantage of the method label constraint is its ability to exploit information available at the caller side
to reduce the number of run-time checks. For example, in the following Jif-DX code the compiler can
determine that the method constraint is satisfied without a run-time check:
(D) Key[Alice]{} k;
int{Alice:Bob} x;
k.encrypt({Alice:Bob}, x);
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3.2.3 Field label constraints
In Jif-DX, label constraints can also be specified on class fields of type label. The compiler ensures that
the field label constraints of a class are satisfied whenever a new instance of the class is created. All fields
appearing in a label constraint must be final, so field label constraints that are satisfied when an object is
created will hold for the lifetime of the object.
Like method label constraints, field label constraints can be used to reduce the number of run-time
label checks. For example, sending an integer through a multilevel communication channel [6] with label
` requires sending the exact label of the integer through the channel. The natural way to implement it is to
wrap the integer and its label in an object of the Labeled class and send the object through the channel.
(E) class Labeled {
public final label{`} lb;
public int{*lb} content;
public Labeled(label{`} x, int{*x} y) { lb = x; content = y; }
}
The label of field lb is `, ensuring that lb itself can be sent through the channel. But the label of field
content is dynamic, and the constraint {*lb} v ` needs to hold for field content to be sent safely
through the channel. This constraint can be enforced by a run-time label check, but it can also be enforced
statically by specifying a field label constraint {*lb} v `, as in the UBLabeled (“UB” stands for upper
bound) class. Sending a UBLabeled object through a channel with label ` is always safe.
(F) class UBLabeled {
public final label{`} lb where {*lb} <= `;
public int{*lb} content;
public UBLabeled(label{`} x, int{*x} y) where {*x} <= ` {
lb = x; content = y;
}
}
3.2.4 Path-expression labels
Consider the Labeled class again, and suppose o is a Labeled object. Then what is the type of o.content?
According to the Labeled class, the precise type would be int{*o.lb}, which cannot be expressed in Jif
because Jif does not allow path expressions such as o.lb to appear in labels.
In Jif-DX, a path expression with the type label can be used in label expressions as long as all the
identifiers in the path expression are final, ensuring that the path expression always has the same value. For
example, if o is a final variable, then {*o.lb} is a legitimate label, and the following code can be used to
access o.content while preserving its precise type.
(G) int{*o.lb} y = o.content;
If o were not a final variable, then o.content would not be well-typed in Jif-DX. But there is an easy
workaround: assign o to a final variable fo and access the content field by fo.content, which has a
well-formed type int{*fo.lb}.
3.2.5 Example: bounded dynamic labeling
In this section, we show how to use the new dynamic label constructs in Jif-DX to implement a MAC
mechanism, which would be much harder and unintuitive to implement in Jif. The MAC mechanism in the
MITRE CMW system [28] associates two labels with each object: a floating label and a fixed mandatory
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label. The floating label is updated accordingly when the content of the object is updated, but is bounded by
the fixed mandatory label in order to prevent the covert channel caused by label updates. The doubly labeled
object can be represented by a UBLabeled (see code fragment F) object in Jif-DX, and the policy that the
floating label be bounded by the mandatory label is represented by the field constraint {*lb} v `, where
{*lb} is the floating label, and ` is the mandatory label.
The following code shows how to update the label and access the content of a UBLabeled object. Simple
as it is, this example demonstrates several subtle issues related to manipulating dynamic labels.
(H) UBLabeled o;
final label{} x, y;
int{*x} data;
...
(1) if ({*x} <= `) o = new UBLabeled(x, data);
final UBLabeled{} fo = o;
(2) if ({*fo.lb} <= {*y})
if ({*y} <= `) o = new UBLabeled(y, fo.content);
(3) int{`} output = fo.content;
int{Alice:} output2;
(4) if ({*fo.lb} <= {Alice:}) output2 = fo.content;
The first label-test statement (1) attempts to update the content of o, and the constraint {*x} <= ` guarantees
the label of the new value is bounded by the mandatory label `. The constructor call new UBLabeled(x,
data) is well-typed because of the constraint {*x} v ` enforced by the label test.
The second label-test statement (2) attempts to just update the label field of o to y. The first test
{*fo.lb} <= {*y} is necessary for new UBLabeled(y, fo.content) to be well-typed, because the type
of fo.content (int{*fo.lb}) must be a subtype of int{*y}. Essentially, the constraint prevents down-
grading the label of the object content. Furthermore, this example shows that the immutability requirement
for label fields is not a fundamental limitation because adding a level of indirection makes it possible to
update o.lb even though the field lb is final.
The last two statements (3,4) attempt to access o.content. The assignment to output is well-typed
because of the field label constraint {*fo.lb} v `. The assignment to output2 might appear secure
because a label test is used to ensure the label of output2 is at least as restrictive as the label of fo.content.
However, there is an implicit flow from fo.lb to output2 in the label-test statement. The implicit flow is
legal only if ` v {Alice:}, which prevents a possible covert channel caused by dynamic labeling.
4 Type system and noninterference
This section formalizes the powerful dynamic label mechanism of Jif-DX and proves its soundness in term
of enforcing noninterference, which means that high-security inputs to a program cannot affect low-security
outputs.
The vehicle for this formal analysis is a core language λDSec focused on modeling the dynamic label
constructs in Jif-DX. Distilling Jif-DX to a simple core language has the advantage that the semantics of the
dynamic label mechanism can be described clearly and formally. Many features of Jif-DX are intentionally
omitted from λDSec , including objects, class inheritance, exceptions, and downgrading; however, these
features are largely orthogonal to the dynamic label mechanism, and their impact on information flow has
been studied in other work [3, 22, 31].
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Base Labels k ∈ L
Variables x, y, f ∈ V
Locations m ∈ M
Labels `, pc ::= k | x | `1 unionsq `2
Constraints C ::= `1 v `2 , C | 
Base Types β ::= int | label | unit | (x :τ1)[C] ∗ τ2 | τ ref | (x :τ1) C ; pc−−−→ τ2
Security Types τ ::= β`
Values v ::= x | n | mτ | λ(x :τ)[C ; pc]. e | () | k | (x=v1[C], v2 :τ)
Expressions e ::= v | `1 unionsq `2 | e1 e2 | !e | e1 := e2 | refτe | if `1 v `2 then e1 else e2
| let (x, y)=v in e
Figure 1: Syntax of λDSec
4.1 The λDSec language
The λDSec language is a security-typed lambda calculus that supports first-class dynamic labels. In λDSec , la-
bels are terms so that they can be manipulated and checked at run time. Furthermore, label terms can be used
as type annotations that are analyzed statically. Syntactic restrictions are imposed on label terms to increase
the practicality of type checking, which follows the approach used by Xi and Pfenning in MLΠ0 (C) [30].
From the computational standpoint, λDSec is fairly expressive, because it supports both first-class func-
tions and state (which together are sufficient to encode recursive functions).
4.1.1 Syntax
The syntax of λDSec is given in Figure 1. We use the name k to range over a lattice of label values L (more
precisely, a join semi-lattice with bottom element ⊥), x, y to range over variable names V , and m to range
over a space of memory addresses M.
To make the lattice explicit, we write L |= k1 v k2 to mean that k2 is at least as restrictive as k1 in L,
and L |= k = k1 unionsq k2 to mean k is the join of k1 and k2 in L. The least and greatest elements of L are
⊥ and >. We also assume L contains at least the points L and H where H 6v L, but the noninterference
result applies to an arbitrary lattice. The label L is assumed to describe what information is observable by
low-security users who are to be prevented from seeing confidential information. Thus, low-security data
has a label bounded above by L; high-security data has a label (such as H) not bounded by L.
In λDSec , a label can be either a label value k, a label variable x, or the join of two other labels `1 unionsq `2.
For example, L, x, and L unionsq x are all valid labels, and L unionsq x can be interpreted as a security policy that is
as restrictive as both L and x. The security type τ = β` is the base type β annotated with label `. The base
types include integers, unit, labels, functions, references and products.
The function type (x : τ1)
C ; pc−−−→ τ2 is a dependent type since τ2, C and pc may mention x. To avoid
recursion, x is not allowed to appear in τ1. The component C is a set of label constraints with the form
`1 v `2, which must be satisfied when the function is invoked. The pc component is a lower bound on the
memory effects of the function, and an upper bound on the pc label of the caller. Consequently, a function
is not able to leak information about where it is called. Without the annotations C and pc, this kind of type
is sometimes written as Πx :τ1.τ2 [13].
The product type (x :τ1)[C]∗ τ2 is also a dependent type in the sense that occurrences of x can appear in
τ2 and C. The component C is a set of label constraints that any value of the product type must satisfy. If τ2
does not contain x, and C is empty, the type may be written as the more familiar τ1 ∗τ2. Without component
C, this kind of type is sometimes written as Σx :τ1.τ2 [13].
8
In λDSec , values include integers n, typed memory locations mτ , functions λ(x : τ)[C ; pc]. e, the unit
value (), constant labels k, and pairs (x= v1[C], v2 : τ). A function λ(x : τ)[C ; pc]. e has one argument x
with type τ , and the components C and pc have the same meanings as those in function types. The empty
constraint set C or the top pc can be omitted. A pair (x=v1[C], v2 :τ) contains two values v1 and v2. The
second element v2 has type τ and may mention the first element v1 by the name x. The component C is a
set of label constraints that the first element of the pair must satisfy. For example, if C is {x v L}, then
v1 v L must be true.
Expressions include values v, variables x, the join of two labels `1 unionsq `2, applications e1 e2, dereferences
!e, assignments e1 := e2, references refτe, label-test expressions if `1 v `2 then e1 else e2, and product
destructors let (x, y)=v in e2.
The label-test expression if `1 v `2 then e1 else e2 is used to examine labels—at run time, if the
value of `2 is a constant label at least as restrictive as the value of `1, then e1 is evaluated, otherwise, e2 is
evaluated. Consequently, the constraint `1 v `2 can be assumed when type-checking e1.
The product destructor let (x, y)=v in e unpacks the pair v, assigns the first element of v to x and the
second to y, and then evaluates e.
4.1.2 Encoding Jif-DX constructs
The λDSec language is designed to model the dynamic label constructs of Jif-DX. Although λDSec is not
object-oriented, first-class functions and products provide some ability to explore issues that arise in a class-
based language (without inheritance).
The label-test statement in Jif-DX can be encoded directly by the label-test expression in λDSec . Methods
in Jif-DX correspond to functions in λDSec , and both constructs allow constraints to be specified on the
arguments of type label. Objects in Jif-DX correspond to product values in λDSec . Just as Jif-DX allows
specifying label constraints on fields, λDSec allows constraints on product components. The λDSec language
provides the product destructor to retrieve the components from a product value. This pattern-matching style
of access not only retrieves the product components, but also preserves constraints.
The following λDSec expressions and types can be used to represent correspondingly labeled code frag-
ments of Jif-DX in Section 3. Since class declarations in Jif-DX are essentially types, some Jif-DX code
corresponds to types of λDSec . The λDSec type in (C) shows how to encode the signature of the method
encrypt. The product types in (E) and (F) are used to encode the Labeled class and the UBLabeled class,
respectively. The function term in (G) shows how to retrieve the components from a product value and use
the components in some computation represented by e. The function in (H) encodes updating a UBLabeled
object. It takes in three arguments: o is a reference of the product type encoding the UBLabeled class; y
is a label; z is an integer labeled with y. The function wraps y and z in a product value and assigns the
product value to o, updating the information contained in o and the corresponding label at the same time. A
label-test expression is used to ensure that the product label constraint holds.
(C) (x :label⊥) xv{p:}−−−−→ (y :intx) −→ int⊥
(E) (x :label`) ∗ intx
(F) (x :label`)[x v `] ∗ intx
(G) λo : ((x :label`) ∗ intx)⊥. let (x, y)=o in e
(H) λo : (((x :label`)[x v `] ∗ intx)` ref)⊥. λy :label`. λ(z :inty)[`].
if y v ` then o := (x=y, z :intx) else ()
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[E1 ] L |= k = k1 unionsq k2〈k1 unionsq k2, M〉 7−→ 〈k, M〉
[E2 ] 〈!mτ , M〉 7−→ 〈M(mτ ), M〉
[E3 ] m = newloc(M)〈refτv, M〉 7−→ 〈mτ , M [mτ 7→ v]〉
[E4 ] 〈mτ := v, M〉 7−→ 〈(), M [mτ 7→ v]〉
[E5 ] 〈(λ(x :τ)[C ; pc]. e) v, M〉 7−→ 〈e[v/x], M〉
[E6 ] L |= k1 v k2〈if k1 v k2 then e1 else e2, M〉 7−→ 〈e1, M〉
[E7 ] L |= k1 6v k2〈if k1 v k2 then e1 else e2, M〉 7−→ 〈e2, M〉
[E8 ] 〈let (x, y)=(x=v1[C], v2 :τ) in e, M〉 7−→ 〈e[v2/y][v1/x], M〉
[E9 ] 〈e, M〉 7−→ 〈e
′, M ′〉
〈E[e], M〉 7−→ 〈E[e′], M ′〉
E[·] ::= [·] e | v [·] | [·] := e | v := [·] | ! [·] | refτ [·] | [·] unionsq `2 | k1 unionsq [·]
| if [·] v `2 then e1 else e2 | if k1 v [·] then e1 else e2
Figure 2: Small-step operational semantics of λDSec
4.1.3 Operational Semantics
The small-step operational semantics of λDSec is given in Figure 2. Let M represent a memory that is a
finite map from typed locations to closed values, and let 〈e, M〉 be a machine configuration. Then a small
evaluation step is a transition from 〈e, M〉 to another configuration 〈e′, M ′〉, written 〈e, M〉 7−→ 〈e′, M ′〉.
It is necessary to restrict the form of 〈e, M〉 to avoid using undefined memory locations. Let loc(e)
represent the set of memory locations appearing in e. A memory M is well-formed if every address m
appears at most once in dom(M), and for any mτ in dom(M), loc(M(mτ )) ⊆ dom(M). The configuration
〈e, M〉 is well-formed if M is well-formed, loc(e) ⊆ dom(M), and e contains no free variables. By
induction on the derivation of 〈e, M〉 7−→ 〈e′, M ′〉, we can prove that if 〈e, M〉 is well-formed, then
〈e′, M ′〉 is also well-formed.
The notation e[v/x] indicates capture-avoiding substitution of value v for variable x in expression e. The
notation M(mτ ) denotes the value mapped to mτ in M , and the notation M [mτ 7→ v] denotes the memory
obtained by assigning v to mτ in M .
The evaluation rules are standard. The allocator newloc(M) in rule (E3) generates a fresh memory
location m such that mτ 6∈ dom(M) for all τ . In rule (E8), v2 may mention x, so substituting v2 for y in
e is performed before substituting v1 for x. The variable name in the product value matches x so that no
variable substitution is needed when assigning v1 and v2 to x and y. In rule (E9), E represents an evaluation
context, a term with a single “hole”, into which a subterm can fit. Rule (E9) says that an evaluation step of
a subterm counts as an evaluation step of the enclosing term. The syntax of E specifies the evaluation order
of subterms.
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[C1 ] L |= k1 v k2` k1 v k2 [C2 ]
`1 v `2 ∈ C
C ` `1 v `2 [C3 ] ` ` v ` unionsq `
′ [C4 ] ` ` v `
[C4 ] C ` `1 v `2 C ` `2 v `3
C ` `1 v `3 [C5 ]
C ` `1 v `3 C ` `2 v `3
C ` `1 unionsq `2 v `3
Figure 3: Relabeling rules
[S1 ] C ` τ1 ≤ τ2 C ` τ2 ≤ τ1
C ` τ1 ref ≤ τ2 ref [S2 ]
C ` τ2 ≤ τ1 C ` τ ′1 ≤ τ ′2
C ` pc2 v pc1 C2 ` C1
C ` (x :τ1) C1 ; pc1−−−−→ τ ′1 ≤ (x :τ2)
C2 ; pc2−−−−→ τ ′2
[S3 ] C ` τ1 ≤ τ2 C ` τ
′
1 ≤ τ ′2 C1 ` C2
C ` (x :τ1)[C1] ∗ τ ′1 ≤ (x :τ2)[C2] ∗ τ ′2
[S4 ] C ` β1 ≤ β2 C ` `1 v `2
C ` (β1)`1 ≤ (β2)`2
Figure 4: Subtyping rules
4.1.4 Subtyping
The subtyping relationship between security types plays an important role in enforcing information flow
security. Given two security types τ1 = β1`1 and τ2 = β2`2 , suppose τ1 is a subtype of τ2, written as
τ1 ≤ τ2. Then any data of type τ1 can be treated as data of type τ2. Thus, data with label `1 may be treated
data with label `2, which requires `1 v `2.
As described in Section 3.1, the type system keeps track of the set of label constraints that can be used
to prove relabeling relationships between labels. Let C ` `1 v `2 denote that `1 v `2 can be inferred
from the set of constraints C. The inference rules are shown in Figure 3; they are standard and consistent
with the lattice properties of labels. Rule (C2) shows that all the constraints in C are assumed to be true.
The constraint set C may contain constraints that are inconsistent with the lattice L, such as H v L.
Inconsistent constraint sets are harmless because they always indicate dead code, such as expression e1 in
“ifH v L then e1 else e2”.
Since the subtyping relationship depends on the relabeling relationship, the subtyping context also needs
to include the C component of the typing context. The inference rules for proving C ` τ1 ≤ τ2 are the rules
shown in Figure 4 plus the standard reflexivity and transitivity rules.
Rules (S1)–(S3) are about subtyping on base types. These rules demonstrate the expected covariance or
contravariance. In λDSec , function types contain two additional components pc and C, both of which are
contravariant. Suppose the function type τ = (x : τ1)
C1 ; pc1−−−−→ τ ′1 is a subtype of τ ′ = (x : τ2)
C2 ; pc2−−−−→ τ ′2.
Then wherever functions with type τ ′ can be called, functions with type τ can also be called. This implies
two necessary premises. First, wherever C2 is satisfied, C1 is also satisfied. This premise is written C2 ` C1,
meaning that for any constraint `1 v `2 in C1, we can derive C2 ` `1 v `2. Second, the premise pc2 v pc1
is needed because the pc of a function type is an upper bound on the pc where the function is applied.
Rule (S4) is used to determine the subtyping on security types. The premise C ` β1 ≤ β2 is natural.
The other premise C ` `1 v `2 guarantees that coercing data from τ1 to τ2 does not violate information
flow policies.
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[INT ] Γ ;C ; pc ` n : int⊥ [UNIT ] Γ ;C ; pc ` () : unit⊥
[LABEL ] Γ ;C ; pc ` k : label⊥ [LOC ]
FV (τ) = ∅
Γ ;C ; pc ` mτ : (τ ref)⊥
[JOIN ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` `1 : label`′1 Γ ;C ; pc ` `2 : label`′2
Γ ;C ; pc ` `1 unionsq `2 : label`′1unionsq`′2
[VAR ] x :τ ∈ Γ
Γ ;C ; pc ` x : τ
[REF ] Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ C ` pc v τ
Γ ;C ; pc ` refτe : (τ ref)⊥ [DEREF ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` e : (τ ref)`
Γ ;C ; pc `!e : τ unionsq `
[ABS ]
Γ, x :τ ′ ;C′ ; pc′ ` e : τ
Γ ;C ; pc ` λ(x :τ ′)[C′ ; pc′]. e : ((x :τ ′) C
′ ; pc′−−−−→ τ)⊥ [ASSIGN ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` e1 : (τ ref)`
Γ ;C ; pc ` e2 : τ C ` pc unionsq ` v τ
Γ ;C ; pc ` e1 := e2 : unit⊥
[L-APP ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` e1 : ((x :label`′) C
′ ; pc′−−−−→ τ)`
Γ ;C ; pc ` `2 : label`′ C ` pc unionsq ` v pc′[`2/x]
C ` C′[`2/x] x ∈ FV (τ) ∪ FV (C′) ∪ FV (pc′)
Γ ;C ; pc ` e1 `2 : τ [`2/x] unionsq ` [APP ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` e1 : ((x :τ ′) C
′ ; pc′−−−−→ τ)`
Γ ;C ; pc ` e2 : τ ′ C ` pc unionsq ` v pc′
C ` C′ x /∈ FV (τ) ∪ FV (C′) ∪ FV (pc′)
Γ ;C ; pc ` e1 e2 : τ unionsq `
[PROD ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` v1 : τ1 Γ, x :τ1 ` τ2
Γ ;C ; pc ` v2[v1/x] : τ2[v1/x] C ` C′[v1/x]
Γ ;C ; pc ` (x=v1[C′], v2 :τ2) : ((x :τ1)[C′] ∗ τ2)⊥ [UNPACK ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` v : ((x :τ1)[C′] ∗ τ2)`
Γ, x :τ1unionsq`, y :τ2unionsq` ; C,C′ ; pc ` e : τ
Γ ;C ; pc ` let (x, y)=v in e : τ
[IF ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` `i : label`′i i ∈ {1, 2}
Γ ; C, `1 v `2 ; pc unionsq `′1 unionsq `′2 ` e1 : τ
Γ ;C ; pc unionsq `′1 unionsq `′2 ` e2 : τ
Γ ;C ; pc ` if `1 v `2 then e1 else e2 : τ unionsq `′1 unionsq `′2 [SUB ]
Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ C ` τ ≤ τ ′
Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ ′
Figure 5: Typing rules for the λDSec language
4.1.5 Typing
The type system of λDSec prevents illegal information flows and guarantees that well-typed programs have
a noninterference property. The typing rules are shown in Figure 5. The notation label(β`) = ` is used
to obtain the label of a type, and the notations ` v τ and τ v ` are abbreviations for ` v label(τ) and
label(τ) v `, respectively.
The typing context includes a type assignment Γ, a set of constraints C and the program-counter label
pc. Γ is a finite ordered list of x : τ pairs in the order that they came into scope. For a given x, there is at
most one pair x :τ in Γ.
A variable appearing in a type must be a label variable. Therefore, a type τ is well-formed with respect
to type assignment Γ, written Γ ` τ , if Γ maps all the variables in τ to label types. The definition of well-
formed labels (Γ ` `) is the same. Consider Γ = x1 : τ1, . . . , xn : τn. For any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, the type τi may
only mention label variables that are already in scope: x1 through xi−1. Therefore, Γ is well-formed if for
any 0 ≤ i ≤ n, τi is well-formed with respect to x1 :τ1, . . . , xi−1 :τi−1. For example, “x :labelL, y :intx”
is well-formed, but “y : intx, x : labelL” is not. A constraint `1 v `2 is well-formed with respect to Γ
if both `1 and `2 are well-formed with respect to Γ. A typing context “Γ ;C ; pc” is well-formed if Γ is
well-formed, and pc and all the constraints in C are well-formed with respect to Γ.
The typing assertion Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ means that with the type assignment Γ, current program-counter
label as pc, and the set of constraints C satisfied, expression e has type τ . The assertion Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ is
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well-formed if Γ ;C ; pc is well-formed, and Γ ` τ .
Rules (INT), (UNIT), (LABEL) and (LOC) are used to check values. Value v has type β⊥ if v has base
type β. Rule (VAR) is standard: variable x has type Γ(x). Rule (JOIN) checks the join of two labels and
assigns a result label that is the join of the labels of the operands.
Rule (REF) checks memory allocation operations. If the pc label is high, the generated memory location
must not be observable to low-security users, which is guaranteed by the premise C ` pc v τ . Rule
(DEREF) checks dereference expressions. Since some information about a reference can be learned by
knowing its contents, the result of dereferencing a reference with type (τ ref)` has type τ unionsq `, where
τ unionsq ` = β`′unionsq` if τ is β`′ . Rule (ASSIGN) checks memory update. As in rule (REF), if the updated memory
location has type (τ ref)`, then C ` pc v τ is required to prevent illegal implicit flows. In addition, the
condition C ` ` v τ protects the reference that is assigned to. Without the condition, the following code
would be well-typed. However, low-security users can learn whether x v L by observing which of m1 and
m2 is updated to 0.
λ(x :labelH)[L]. ((if x v L then mintL1 else mintL2 ) := 0)
Rule (ABS) checks function values. The body is checked with the constraint set C ′ and the program-
counter label pc′, so the function can only be called at places where C ′ is satisfied and the pc label is not
more restrictive than pc′.
Rules (L-APP) and (APP) are used to check application expressions. Consider an application expression
e1e2, where e1 has type ((x : label`′)
C′ ; pc′−−−−→ τ)`. Rule (L-APP) is used when the occurrences of x do
appear in C ′, pc′ or τ . In this case, the type checker needs to use C ′[e2/x], pc′[e2/x] or τ [e2/x], which
are well-formed only if e2 is a label term `2. In rule (L-APP), the label of e1`2 is at least as restrictive as
`, preventing the result of e1 from being leaked. The premise C ` C ′[`2/x] guarantees that C ′[`2/x] are
satisfied when the function is invoked. The premise C ` pc unionsq ` v pc′[`2/x] ensures that the invocation
cannot leak the program counter or the function itself through the memory effects of the function. Rule
(APP) applies when x does not appear in C ′, pc′ or τ . In this case, the type of e1 is just a normal function
type, so e1 can be applied to arbitrary terms.
Rule (PROD) is used to check product values. To check v2, the occurrences of x in v2 and τ2 are both
replaced by v1. If v1 is not a label, then x cannot appear in τ2. Thus, τ2[v1/x] is always well-formed no
matter whether v1 is a label or not. Rule (UNPACK) checks product destructors straightforwardly. After
unpacking the product value, those product label constraints in C ′ are in scope and used for checking e.
Rule (IF) checks label-test expressions. The constraint `1 v `2 is added into the typing context when
checking the first branch e1. When checking the branches, the program-counter label subsumes the labels
of `1 and `2 to protect them from implicit flows. The resulting type contains `′1 and `′2 because the result is
influenced by the values of `1 and `2.
Rule (SUB) is the standard subsumption rule. If τ is a subtype of τ ′ with the constraints in C satisfied,
then any expression of type τ also has type τ ′.
This type system satisfies the subject reduction property and the progress property. The proof is standard,
so we simply state the theorems here.
Definition 4.1 (Well-typed memory). A memory M is well-typed if for any memory location mτ in M ,
`M(mτ ) : τ .
Theorem 4.1 (Subject reduction). Suppose pc ` e : τ , and there exists a well-typed memory M such that
〈e, M〉 7−→ 〈e, M ′〉, then M ′ is well-typed, and pc ` e′ : τ .
Theorem 4.2 (Progress). If pc ` e : τ , and M is a well-typed memory such that 〈e, M〉 is a well-formed
configuration, then either e is a value or there exists e′ and M ′ such that 〈e, M〉 7−→ 〈e′, M ′〉.
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4.2 Noninterference proof
This section outlines a proof that any well-typed program in λDSec satisfies the noninterference property.
(The full proof is given in the appendix.) Consider an expression e in λDSec . Suppose e has one free variable
x, and x : τ ` e : intL where H v τ . Thus, the value of x is a high-security input to e, and the result of e is
a low-security output. Then noninterference requires that for all values v of type τ , evaluating e[v/x] in the
same memory must generate the same result, if the evaluation terminates. For simplicity, we only consider
that results are integers because they can be compared outside the context of λDSec .
The noninterference property discussed here is termination insensitive [20] because e[v/x] is required
to generate the same result only if the evaluation terminates. The type system of λDSec does not attempt
to control termination and timing channels. Control of these channels is largely an orthogonal problem.
Termination channels can leak at most one bit per run, so they have often been considered acceptable (e.g.,
[5, 26]). Some recent work [1, 19, 33] partially addresses the control of timing channels.
Let 7−→∗ denote the transitive closure of the 7−→ relationship. The following theorem formalizes the
claim that the type system of λDSec enforces noninterference:
Theorem 4.3 (Noninterference). Suppose x : τ ` e : intL, and H v τ . Given two arbitrary values v1
and v2 of type τ , and an initial memory M , if 〈e[vi/x], M〉 7−→∗ 〈v′i, M ′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}, then v′1 = v′2.
To prove this noninterference theorem, we adapt the elegant proof technique developed by Pottier and
Simonet for an ML-like security-typed language [18] (which did not have dynamic labels). To show that
noninterference holds, it is necessary to reason about the executions of two related terms: e[v1/x] and
e[v2/x]. We extend λDSec with a bracket construct (e1 |e2) that represents alternative expressions that might
arise during the evaluation of two programs that differs initially only in v1 and v2. Then e[v1/x] and e[v2/x]
can be incorporated into a single term e[(v1 | v2)/x] in the extended language λ2DSec , providing a syntactic
way to reason about two executions.
Using λ2DSec , the noninterference theorem can be proved in three steps:
1. Prove that the evaluation of λ2DSec adequately represents the execution of two λDSec terms. Given a
λ2DSec term e, let bec1 and bec2 represent the two λDSec terms encoded by e. Further, if M maps x
to a λ2DSec term e, then bMci maps x to beci for i ∈ {1, 2}. Then the adequacy of λ2DSec means that
〈e, M〉 7−→∗ 〈v, M ′〉 holds in λ2DSec if and only if 〈beci, bMci〉 7−→∗ 〈bvci, M ′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}
holds in λDSec .
2. Prove that λ2DSec satisfies subject reduction: the result of an expression has the same type as the
expression. The type system of λ2DSec gives the bracket (e1 | e2) a high-security type. Intuitively, e1
and e2 are different terms and may produce different results, which must have high-security types and
be unobservable to low-security users because otherwise low-security users can distinguish the two
executions, violating noninterference.
3. Prove the noninterference theorem: Because 〈e[vi/x], M〉 7−→∗ 〈v′i, M ′i〉 and e[vi/x] = be[(v1|v2)/x]ci
for i ∈ {1, 2}, we have 〈e[(v1 | v2)/x], M〉 7−→∗ 〈v′, M ′〉, where bv′ci = v′i for i ∈ {1, 2}. By the
subject reduction theorem, ` v′ : intL, which implies that v′ is not a bracket construct. Then v′ must
be an integer n, and bv′c1 = bv′c2 = n.
The appendix details the syntax and semantic extensions of λ2DSec and proves the key subject reduction
theorem of λ2DSec . The major extension to Pottier’s proof technique is that the bracket construct must also
be applied to labels. Because types may contain bracketed labels, the projection operation also applies to
typing environments.
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5 Related Work
Dynamic information flow control mechanisms [27, 28] track security labels dynamically and use run-time
security checks to constrain information propagation. These mechanisms are transparent to programs, but
they cannot prevent illegal implicit flows arising from the control flow paths not taken at run time.
Various general security models [11, 24, 7] have been proposed to incorporate dynamic labeling. Unlike
noninterference, these models define what it means for a system to be secure according to a certain relabeling
policy, which may allow downgrading labels.
Using static program analysis to check information flow was first proposed by Denning and Denning [5];
later work phrased the analysis as type checking (e.g., [17]). Noninterference was later developed as a more
semantic characterization of security [8], followed by many extensions. Volpano, Smith and Irvine [26] first
showed that type systems can be used to enforce noninterference, and proved a version of noninterference
theorem for a simple imperative language, starting a line of research pursuing the noninterference result for
more expressive security-typed languages. Heintze and Riecke [10] proved the noninterference theorem for
the SLam calculus, a purely functional language. Zdancewic and Myers [32] investigated a secure calculus
with first-class continuations and references. Pottier and Simonet [18] considered an ML-like functional
language, and demonstrated the innovative proof technique that is used in this paper to reduce the proof of
noninterference to a proof of subject reduction. Banerjee and Naumann [3] proved a noninterference result
for a Java-like language. A more complete survey of language-based information-flow techniques can be
found in [20].
The Jif language [14, 16] extends Java with a type system for analyzing information flow, and aims to be
a practical language for developing secure applications. However, there is not yet a noninterference proof
for the type system of Jif, because of its complexity. This work is inspired by the dynamic label mechanism
of Jif, although the dynamic label mechanism in Jif-DX and λDSec is more expressive.
Concurrent to this work, Tse and Zdancewic proved a noninterference result for a security-typed lambda
calculus (λDP) with dynamic principals [25]. Our work is more general in the sense that it can be applied
to label models that do not involve principals. In addition, λDSec has more computational power than λDP
because λDSec supports references, which can used to encode recursive functions. The type system of
λDP uses singleton types [2] to enforce that every dynamic principal term has a static counterpart, and the
dynamism of security policies is captured by the principal hierarchy and a delegation mechanism. It is not
clear that this approach can be easily generalized to dynamic labels.
Other work [30, 29] has used dependent type systems to specify complex program invariants and to
statically catch program errors considered run-time errors by traditional type systems. This work also makes
a trade-off between expressive power and practical type checking.
6 Conclusions
This paper makes two contributions: first, it presents the Jif-DX language that extends the Jif programming
model with better support for dynamic labels. The extensions proposed in Jif-DX make it easier to write
programs manipulating dynamic labels and can reduce the number of run-time label checks. The key new
element is a restricted form of label constraints that is expressive enough for implementing run-time security
checks, yet suitable for static type checking. Label constraints also make it possible to encode previous
mandatory access control mechanisms that support dynamically changing labels.
Second, this paper formalizes computation and static checking of dynamic labels in the type system of
a core language λDSec and proves a noninterference result: well-typed programs have the noninterference
property. The language λDSec is the first language supporting general dynamic labels whose type system
provably enforces noninterference.
An important direction for future work is to investigate the interaction between dynamic labels and
parametric polymorphism.
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A Subject Reduction Proof
As described in Section 4.2, the noninterference result for λDSec is proved by extending the language to
a new language λ2DSec that includes the special bracket construct. Then the subject reduction property
for λ2DSec implies the noninterference property for λDSec . The appendix details the syntax and semantic
extensions of λ2DSec and proves the key subject reduction theorem.
A.1 Syntax extensions
The syntax extensions of λ2DSec include the bracket constructs and a new value void that can have any type.
A λ2DSec memory encodes two λDSec memories, which may have distinct domains. The bindings of the form
mτ 7→ (v | void) and mτ 7→ (void | v) represent situations where mτ is bound within only one of the two
λDSec memories.
` ::= . . . | (` | `)
v ::= . . . | (v | v) | void
e ::= . . . | (e | e)
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The bracket constructs cannot be nested, so the subterms of a bracket construct must be λDSec terms or
void. Given a λ2DSec expression e, let bec1 and bec2 represent the two λDSec terms that e encodes. The
projection functions satisfy b(e1 |e2)ci = ei and are homomorphisms on other expression forms. In addition,
(e1 | e2)[v/x], the capture-free substitution of v for x in (e1 | e2), must use the corresponding projection of
v in each branch: (e1 | e2)[v/x] = (e1[bvc1/x] | e2[bvc2/x]).
In λ2DSec , labels can be bracket constructs, and types may contain bracketed labels. Thus, the projection
operation can be applied to labels, types, type assignments, and label constraints. Similarly, the projection
functions are homomorphisms on these typing constructs. For example, bint(L |H)c1 = intL, and bx :
τ, y :τ ′c1 = x :bτc1, y :bτ ′c1.
The following relabeling rule is added to reason about relabeling relationship between bracketed labels:
bCc1 ` b`1c1 v b`2c1 bCc2 ` b`1c2 v b`2c2
C ` `1 v `2
Since a λ2DSec term effectively encodes two λDSec terms, the evaluation of a λ2DSec term can be projected
into two λDSec evaluations. An evaluation step of a bracket expression (e1 |e2) is an evaluation step of either
e1 or e2. and e1 or e2 can only access the corresponding projection of the memory. Thus, the configuration
of λ2DSec has an index i ∈ {•, 1, 2} that indicates whether the term to be evaluated is a subterm of a bracket
expression, and if so which branch of a bracket the term belongs to. For example, the configuration 〈e, M〉1
means that e belongs to the first branch of a bracket, and e can only access the first projection of M . We
write “〈e, M〉” for “〈e, M〉•”, which means e does not belong to any bracket.
A.2 Operational semantics
The operational semantics of λ2DSec is shown in Figure 6. It is based on the semantics of λDSec and contains
some new evaluation rules (E10–E14) for manipulating bracket constructs. Rules (E2)–(E4) are modified
to access the memory projection corresponding to index i. The rest of the rules in Figure 2 are adapted to
λ2DSec by indexing each configuration with i. The following two lemmas state that the operational semantics
of λ2DSec is adequate to encode the execution of two λDSec terms. Their proof is straightforward.
Lemma A.1 (Soundness). If 〈e, M〉 7−→ 〈e′, M ′〉, then 〈beci, bMci〉 7−→ 〈be′ci, bM ′ci〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Lemma A.2 (Completeness). If 〈beci, bMci〉 7−→∗ 〈vi, M ′i〉 for i ∈ {1, 2}, then there exists a configura-
tion 〈v, M ′〉 such that 〈e, M〉 7−→∗ 〈v, M ′〉.
The type system of λ2DSec includes all the typing rules in Figure 5 and has two additional rules, one for
typing void, the other for typing bracket constructs.
[VOID] Γ ;C ; pc ` void : τ
[BRACKET ] bΓc1 ;bCc1 ;bpc
′c1 ` e1 : bτc1 bΓc2 ;bCc2 ;bpc′c2 ` e2 : bτc2 H unionsq pc v pc′ H v τ
Γ ;C ; pc ` (e1 | e2) : τ
A.3 Subject reduction
The proof of subject reduction starts with some lemmas about projection and substitution.
Lemma A.3 (Label Projection). If C ` `1 v `2, then bCci ` b`1ci v b`2ci for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of C ` `1 v `2.
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[E2] 〈!mτ , M〉i 7−→ 〈readi M(mτ ), M〉i
[E3 ] m = newloc(M)〈refτv, M〉i 7−→ 〈mτ , M [mτ 7→ newi v]〉i
[E4] 〈mτ := v, M〉i 7−→ 〈(), M [mτ 7→ updatei M(mτ ) v]〉i
[E10 ]
〈ei, M〉i 7−→ 〈e′i, M ′〉i ej = e′j {i, j} = {1, 2}
〈(e1 | e2), M〉 7−→ 〈(e′1 | e′2), M ′〉
[E11] 〈(v1 | v2)v, M〉 7−→ 〈(v1bvc1 | v2bvc2), M〉
[E12] 〈(v1 | v2) := v, M〉 7−→ 〈(v1 := bvc1 | v2 := bvc2), M〉
[E13] 〈!(v1 | v2), M〉 7−→ 〈(!v1 | !v2), M〉
[E14] 〈if v1 v v2 then e1 else e2, M〉 7−→ 〈(if bv1c1 v bv2c1 then be1c1 else be2c1 |
if bv1c2 v bv2c2 then be1c2 else be2c2),M〉
if v1 = (v | v′) or v2 = (v | v′)
[Auxiliary functions]
new• v = v update• vv′ = v′ read• v = v
new1 v = (v | void) update1 vv′ = (v′ | bvc2) read1 v = bvc1
new2 v = (void | v) update2 vv′ = (bvc1 | v′) read2 v = bvc2
Figure 6: Small-step operational semantics of λ2DSec
Lemma A.4 (Constraint Reduction). If Γ ;C, `1 v `2 ; pc ` e : τ and C ` `1 v `2, then Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ .
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ;C, `1 v `2 ; pc ` e : τ .
Lemma A.5 (Projection). If Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ , then bΓci ;bCci ;bpcci ` beci : bτci, for i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ , and using the label projection lemma.
Lemma A.6 (Store Access). Let i be in {•, 1, 2}. Suppose pc ` v : τ and pc ` v′ : τ . In addition,
i ∈ {1, 2} implies H v τ . Then pc ` readi v : bτci, pc ` newi v : τ and pc ` updatei vv′ : τ .
Proof. By the definition of the functions read, new and update in Figure 6, by the projection lemma, and
rules (VOID) and (BRACKET).
Lemma A.7 (Substitution). If x : τ ′,Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ , and ` v : τ ′, then Γ[v/x] ;C[v/x] ; pc[v/x] `
e[v/x] : τ [v/x].
Proof. By induction on the derivation of x :τ ′,Γ ;C ; pc ` e : τ .
Theorem A.1 (Subject Reduction). Suppose pc ` e : τ , memory M is well-typed, 〈e, M〉i 7−→ 〈e′, M ′〉i,
and i ∈ {1, 2} implies H v pc. Then pc ` e′ : τ , and M ′ is also well-typed.
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Proof. By induction on the derivation of 〈e, M〉i 7−→ 〈e′, M ′〉i. Without loss of generality, we assume that
the last step of the derivation of pc ` e : τ does not use the rule (SUB). Here we just show seven cases:
(E3), (E5), (E6), (E8), (E10), (E11) and (E14). The rest of evaluation rules are treated similarly.
• Case (E3). e is refτ ′ v, and τ is (τ ′ ref)⊥. Then e′ is mτ ′ . By (LOC), pc ` e′ : (τ ′ ref)⊥. By
Lemma A.6, pc ` newiv : τ ′. Thus, M [mτ ′ 7→ newiv] is well-typed.
• Case (E5). e is (λ(x : τ ′)[C ′ ; pc′]. e′)v. Then pc ` λ(x : τ ′)[C ′ ; pc′]. e′ : ((x : τ ′′) C
′′ ; pc′′−−−−−→ τ1)`, and
pc ` v : τ ′′, and ` C ′′[v/x]. By rules (APP) and (L-APP), τ = τ1[v/x] unionsq `, and pc v pc′′[v/x].
By rules (ABS) and (SUB), x : τ ′ ;C ′ ; pc′ ` e′ : τ1, and ` τ ′′ ≤ τ ′, ` pc′′ v pc′, and C ′′ ` C ′.
Therefore, ` C ′[v/x], and pc v pc′[v/x]. By the substitution lemma, C ′[v/x] ; pc′[v/x] ` e′[v/x] :
τ1[v/x]. By Lemma A.4, pc′[v/x] ` e′[v/x] : τ1[v/x]. Since pc v pc′[v/x] and τ1[v/x] v τ , we
have pc ` e′[v/x] : τ .
• Case (E6). By rule (IF), k1 v k2 ; pc ` e1 : τ . By Lemma A.4 and L |= k1 v k2, we have pc ` e1 : τ .
• Case (E8). e is let (x, y) = (x= v1[C], v2 : τ2) in e′. By rule (UNPACK), pc ` (x= v1[C], v2 :
τ2) : ((x : τ1)[C] ∗ τ2)`, and x : τ1 unionsq `, y : τ2 unionsq ` ; pc ` e′ : τ . By rule (PROD), pc ` v1 : τ1, and
pc ` v2[v1/x] : τ2[v1/x], and ` C[v1/x]. Using the substitution lemma twice, we get C[v1/x] ; pc `
e′[v1/x][v2[v1/x]/y] : τ [v1/x][v2[v1/x]/y]. It is easy to show that e′[v1/x][v2[v1/x]/y] = e′[v2/y][v1/x].
According to rule (UNPACK), x, y 6∈ FV (τ). Thus, τ [v1/x][v2[v1/x]/y] = τ . In addition, we have
` C[v1/x]. Therefore, pc ` e[v1/x][v2/y] : τ .
• Case (E10). e is (e1 | e2). Without loss of generality, assume 〈e1, M〉1 7−→ 〈e′1, M ′〉1 and e2 = e′2.
By rule (BRACKET), H v pc, and bpcc1 ` e1 : bτc1. H v pc implies H v bpcc1. By induction,
bpcc1 ` e′1 : bτc1, and M ′ is well-typed. Using rule (BRACKET), we can get pc ` (e′1 | e′2) : τ .
• Case (E11). e is (v1 | v2)v. By (APP) and (L-APP), pc ` (v1 | v2) : ((x :τ ′) C
′ ; pc′−−−−→ τ ′′)`, and pc ` v :
τ ′. Then τ = τ ′′[v/x]unionsq`. In addition, pcunionsq` v pc′. By (BRACKET), H v `, which implies H v pc′.
By Lemma A.5, bpcci ` vi : ((x : bτ ′ci) bC
′ci ;bpc′ci−−−−−−−→ bτci)b`ci , and bpcci ` bvci : bτ ′ci, which
imply bpcci ` vibvci : bτci. According to (APP) and (L-APP), a well-typed application expression
e1e2 can be type-checked with the pc component of the type of e1 in the typing context. Therefore,
bpc′ci ` vibvci : bτci. Since H v pc′, we can apply (BRACKET) to get pc ` (v1bvc1 | v2bvc2) : τ .
• Case (E14). e is if v1 v v2 then e1 else e2, and there exists j ∈ {1, 2} such that vj = (v | v′).
Suppose pc ` vi : label`i for i ∈ {1, 2}. Since vj is a bracket construct, H v `j . By (IF), both e1
and e2 are type-checked with pcunionsq `1 unionsq `2 in the typing context. Thus, we can get pcunionsq `1 unionsq `2 ` e : τ .
By Lemma A.5, bpc unionsq `1 unionsq `2ci ` beci : bτci. H v `j implies H v bpc unionsq `1 unionsq `2ci. Applying
(BRACKET), we get pc ` (bec1 | bec2) : τ .
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